London agreed. But how? Grab the big names first? Or pluck ‘low-hanging fruit’? Either took careful planning, as British soldiers would risk their lives.

The new Labour Government in 1997 wanted to show the steely side to their ‘ethical foreign policy’. They went for the less dramatic option. In July 1997 British forces jumped out to arrest Hague indictee Simo Drljaca, who was killed in an ensuing gun battle. The Izetbegovic media in Sarajevo labelled this as British perfidy boosting Serbian nationalist forces.

Karadzic faded from the scene, but his influence remained. In late 1997 I proposed to London that I attempt to see him secretly to try to negotiate his surrender – I would have been the first Serbian-speaking Western senior diplomat he had met. Robin Cook (I gather) liked the idea but was advised to consult Madeleine Albright, who did not. It was unclear to me why. No action.

More indictee ‘fruit’ was collected. Karadzic went deep underground. NATO forces in Bosnia diminished. The extensive recce work needed to grab him became ever harder. We kept trying, for long years, but to no avail. Until this week.

The moral of this story? Front-load for success.

If Western forces do intervene on the ground in another country, they are never stronger than in the first few weeks. Failure promptly to remove from power the worst villains dismays local moderates - and empowers the cynical thought that there is a dirty deal to keep the worst gangsters in business.

Charles Crawford blogs at www.charlescrawford.biz